We investigate the impact of backward compatibility on the adoption of multi-generation platforms. Our context is a mobile platform where platform users download services from third party providers. For each hardware platform generations, the services depend greatly on the embedded functionality. Newer handsets are backward compatible with respect to services. We develop a model to identify several drivers of adoption of subsequent generations of handsets, which include (i) the migration from older to newer generations of handsets, (ii) the relationship between services and handset users, and (iii) backward compatibility effect of handsets with respect to older generation services. Our main finding is that the backward compatibility effect has a perhaps unintended consequence; the continued use of older generation services on newer generation handsets provides a fresh lease on life for older generation handsets. This 'shot in the arm' for older generation handsets effect is due to the users who remain on or adopt an older generation platform instead of adopting a newer generation platform.
Introduction
Many IT products and services such as IBM mainframe systems (Mahajan and Muller 1996) and wireless telecommunication services evolve over several generations.
1 Like these services and products, demand for a new generation platform comes partly from older generations (migration), and partly from customers new to the platform altogether. When a new technology is incompatible with the previous generation and its associated ecosystem, this raises a barrier to migration to the new version since previous generation adopters might be heavily vested in deploying solutions or using complementary resources on the top of the old platform (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999) . Moreover, in the case of cross-generational incompatibility, an ecosystem for an older generation might be more mature and diverse in what it offers compared to an incipient ecosystem for a new platform, at least in the beginning, thus potentially deterring even first-time adopters from embracing the newer generation.
Lastly, in the presence of network effects, the new generation has to play catch in the beginning in building an installed base to boost these effects under incompatibility. Farrell and Saloner (1986) claim that in such cases, "early adopters [of the new generation] bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs" which may lead to "excess inertia". To overcome these barriers, many platform providers embed backward compatibility in their newer generations, allowing them to replicate capabilities of the older systems. For example, certain versions of Microsoft Windows 7 operating system allow users to run older applications developed for Windows XP in a virtualized environment called "XP mode" (McDougall 2009 ).
The academic literature on multi-generation products (Bass 1995) has treated the introduction of a new generation as a generational handover; a technological substitution of the earlier generation by the new generation. Once the next iteration of the product or service is introduced, the adopters of the old generation migrate to the new generation over time. Given its ability to lower barriers to adoption of a new generation, backward compatibility has been argued to be a catalyst to the adoption of subsequent 3 generations (Claussen et al. 2012) . One side of the story would be that under backward compatibility, all capabilities are retained and thus there are fewer drawbacks from an upgrade. However, for some users, new features carry small value and thus they adopt an old generation and forgo the new generation. Of course, one factor that influences the adoption of older generation platforms once the new ones are released is the price markdown associated with the older generation. In this paper, in addition to the price effect, we attempt to identify and test another effect that may extend the value of an older generation during the time when it coexists along with newer generations in the market, namely the lease on life for old generations due to backward compatibility of newer generations. To the best of our knowledge, this effect has not been widely explored in the existing literature. In the presence of backward compatibility, we conjecture (and set out to test empirically), that complementary services/products can connect users even if they operate on different platform generations. For example, two cell phone users, even if they use different handset generations, may be able to exchange text messages, play the same old game and upload scores to community ranking boards, or contribute content to the same online social network. For users of older platforms who value the associated older services a lot and do not derive a lot of benefit from services designed explicitly to take advantage of the new features introduced in subsequent platform generations, backward compatibility can actually increase the value of the older generation due to network externalities. On services that matter to them, these adopters of the older platform can communicate with all other users, and the value of older services increases or these services endure longer as a result of more traffic (some of it coming from newer generations). As such, this lease on life may slow down the migration process to newer generations.
In this study, we focus on mobile Internet platforms and the associated services and attempt to identify and measure the lease on life effect for older generation platforms due to backward compatibility of older platforms. Our study is motivated by observed adoption and consumption data from an Asian telecom carrier over a span of seven years (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Over this window, the carrier introduced four distinct platform generations (with backward compatibility embedded in each new release) and third party providers built an ecosystem of services and apps around these platforms. Data is described in detail in 4 Section 3. As can be seen from Figure 2 (a), for at least five years generation 1 platform (the oldest) coexisted in the market along newer generations and, towards the end of 2007, the decrease in installed base slowed down a lot indicating that this platform can still remain the preferred choice for some customers for some time to come.
Following the multi-generation diffusion literature (Blackman 1974; Norton and Bass 1987; Mahajan and Muller 1996; Jun and Park 1999; Chu and Pan 2008, Jiang and Jain 2012) ,
we model the lifecycle of multi-generation platforms from a multi-generation diffusion point of view. Our contribution to existing literature is twofold. First, on the modeling side, we advance one integrated framework that accounts for various factors that influence adoption dynamics in a multi-generation platform context: (i) the indirect network externality induced by complementary value-adding services,
(ii) the migration from the old generation to the new generation, (iii) and the lease on life induced to an old generation due to consumption of older services by users running on newer platforms. Most multigeneration diffusion literature focuses on migration and does not explicitly model indirect network externality induced by the consumption of a complementary service. The models in Gupta et al. (1999) , Nair et al. (2004) , Li et al. (2006) , Dewan et al. (2010) , and Niculescu and Whang (2012) include the effects of complements but do not explore in depth interactions between product generations.
Our empirical analysis reveals that, when controlling for the price difference effects (which can also lead to a prolonged life of older generations), backward compatibility is statistically significant. This finding has important managerial implications for ecosystems built around platforms. Depending on the industry, the lease on life for an old generation platform could cause significant amount of maintenance expenses to the firm, and to avoid these extra expenses, the firm may need to force migration to newer versions by deliberately shutting down the old platform or phase out backward compatibility for an older platform at some point in time.
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A Simplified Model and Assumptions
For expositional clarity, we first introduce the model and build the theory based on a hypothetical market that has two platform generations (platform 1 and 2) and single service available for each (service 1 and 2). Platform 1 and service 1 are introduced in the market before platform 2 and service 2. The parameterization for the full model is discussed in Section 4.1. Platform 2 (the newer one) exhibits backward compatibility in that its adopters can access both service 1 and 2, but platform 1 adopters can access only service 1. Let   2) Service consumption effect due to new features: The value of a platform increases as its supporting service (built on new features introduced in the current platform) becomes popular. This can be perceived as an indirect network externality since one would expect that consumption of such services increases as more adopters join the platform. 3) Lease on life: Since a platform allows for backward compatibility with respect to services, the adopters of platform 2 can consume both services 1 and 2, and as more platform 2 users consume service 1, platform 1 and its supporting service become more valuable, as argued in the Introduction. As such platform 1 gets a lease on life due to the backward compatibility.
From the relationships illustrated in Figure 1 is the cumulative adoption probability of platform i by time t . Similar to Bass et al. (1994) to we parameterize   t F i as:
Let i  be the time at which platform i was introduced in the market. Then,   0
Without loss of generality we adjust the timeline such that is endogenous in our model we estimate equations (4) and (5) simultaneously.
The multi-generation diffusion literature (Blackman 1974; Norton and Bass 1987; Mahajan and Muller 1996; Jun and Park 1999) 
The adopters of platform 1 migrate to platform 2 with the same rate that the new adopters adopt platform 2 and the number of platform 1 adopters becomes zero when platform 2 reaches the market potential. This assumption is more likely to hold true when there are low switching costs (e.g., no stringent lock-in mechanisms such as long-term contracts) from one platform to another. We confirm that our data correspond to a carrier for whom most wireless contracts are short term (a couple of months).
We stipulate that lease on life for platform 1 is in direct proportion of the traffic volume of service 1 accessed by platform 2 users. Thus, we define
 is the coefficient of lease on life and   t Z 1 represents the set of control variables for platform 1 such as the price advantage of platform 1. A firm often cuts prices of the previous platform after it launches a new one, and some consumers choose to adopt the older platform due to this price advantage. 1  and 1  8 are assumed to be non-negative; that is, there is no negative lease on life.
  t
Tr 21 is endogenous to the model. Thus, we control endogeneity by estimating (7) and (8) simultaneously.
Mobile Internet Platform: Research Context and Data Description
Research Context: Mobile Internet Platform
We obtained monthly data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption from a major wireless carrier in an Asian country with a highly developed mobile telecommunication infrastructure for building on the capabilities of each platform have also been introduced by third-party providers. Table 1 summarizes each of these platforms and services. discussed that the diffusion model parameter estimates can be biased (left-hand truncation bias) if the data from when the product/service was released is not available (Jiang et al. 2006) . Therefore, using available data, we interpolated the missing data.
4 Table 2 summarizes the available and interpolated time periods for each variable. 
We choose k that gives the highest adjusted R-square while keeping all k  significant. We provide the details of how we interpolated the missing data (e.g., parameter
4 Please note that 
where j  is the service multiplier and i  is the platform (or backward compatibility) multiplier. Then,  . Our estimation can be biased if there are price and time effects. However, there was little change in per-packet traffic fees over the time window of our study, and for the same service, the same fee was charged to all users regardless of their platforms. All packet transactions that were sent and received by each user were charged by four different rates as described in Table 3 . The rates for text, application, and multimedia were reduced by 30% in February 2007. We considered a more complex parameterization of traffic including also learning effects in equation (15) but those turned out not significant. Thus, we dropped those parameters. Table 4 shows the parameter estimates and model fits. All parameters are significant and adjusted R-square values are considerably high. 
Note: dTr i = Tr i (t) -Tr i (t-1); We omitted (t) for brevity.
Price of handheld devices
In the Asian country that we study, each handheld device could be used only on the network of the locked wireless carrier. We collected from an online forum the store prices of 73 handheld devices in November 2007 that were locked on the network of the wireless carrier that we study. The release prices of 16 devices, among 73, those were released in either 2005 or early 2006, were also available from the forum.
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The average release store price of 16 devices is $558 and the average store price of handheld devices in November 2007 by each mobile Internet platform is as summarized in Table 5 . 
Total/Average 73 (100%) 442
Comprehensive time series of price data for mobile handheld devices due to scarce historical data on the many different devices (with short lifecycles) available on carriers at various points in time, along with their associated price trend from introduction until discontinuation. We interpolate time series of average prices of handheld devices for each mobile Internet platform using the average release store price and the average store price for each mobile internet platform in November 2007. To interpolate the date, we make the following two assumptions. First, we assume that on average, the release price point for handheld devices is relatively the same for all generations. It is fairly common practice especially in IT industry. The release prices of new versions of many IT products are identical to those of earlier versions.
Second, we make the assumption that the average price of handheld devices for each mobile Internet 14 platform decreases with a constant percentage change over time. Figure 4 illustrates the interpolated time series of average price of handheld devices for each mobile internet platform. 
The Impact of Backward Compatibility on Platform Adoption Decisions
Empirical specification
In this section, extending the model in Section 2 to four generations, we investigate the impact of backward compatibility on platform adoption decisions. In the general case, there can be multiple services associated with each platform and variable   t Tr ij accounts for service consumption (packet traffic) from all users of a specific platform generation i with respect to services specific to platform generation j, where j i  . The relationships between platforms and services when there are four generations of platforms and services are illustrated in Figure 5 and 
Model estimation and results
Following prior literature Dewan et al. 2010) , we estimate the model using nonlinear seemingly unrelated (NLSUR) regression methodology with boundary conditions. We include the nonnegativity assumptions that we discussed in Section 2. The model fits to the data very well and adjusted R-squares are noticeably high. We discuss the results regarding the market potential, innovation and imitation effects, service consumption effects due to new features, and lease on life in the following paragraphs.
Market potential
The market potential of platform 1 ( 1 m ) is 8.43 million and it increased by 1.06 million for platform 4 ( 4 m ). The market potential for platform 2 and platform 3, 2 m and 3 m respectively, are not significant.
This result is consistent with the observed actions of the wireless carrier, which launched platform 3 only four months after platform 2, and platform 4 10 months after platform 3. Overall, the wireless carrier launched three subsequent generations of platforms and services in 14 months.
Innovation and imitation effects
All parameters for innovation ( i p ) and imitation ( i q ) effects are positive and significant. Across four generations, the average innovation effect is 0.006 and the average imitation effect is 0.077. The diffusion literature has shown that the innovation and imitation effects vary widely across products (see Lilen and Rangaswamy (2006) for the list of innovation and imitation effects across products). For our context, it appears that the innovation effects are similar to the cellular phone industry (0.008) and the imitation effects resemble the one observed ones in the cable TV industry (0.060). 
Service Consumption Effects due to New Features
Parameters for service consumption effects due to new features ( i  ) are all positive and significant confirming that the value of a platform, and thereby, the number of adopters of a platform increases as its supporting services become more popular. While the consumption effects of services for generations 1 ( 1  = 38.2850) and 3 ( 3  = 22.0100) are relatively strong, the similar effects associated with services for generation 2 ( 2  = 6.5924) and 4 ( 4  = 3.5429) are relatively weak. This result is consistent with the service offerings introduced in each generation; while service 1 (e.g., short-text-based instant messengers) and 3 (e.g., multimedia messaging services) require extensive communications between users, a big portion of services for generation 2 (e.g., mobile games, banking, and stock trading) and 4 (e.g., live TV and video on demand) are stand-alone, and hence, require relatively little communication between users.
Lease on life
The estimation result confirms that there is a lease on life for platform 1 and 2 due to the backward compatibility. However, 3
 is constrained by the boundary condition and we are not able to identify a lease on life for platform 3. One potential explanation for this result might be that the time window that we study is not sufficiently long enough for platform 3. The market for platform 3 had grown until late 2006 and we have data till the end of 2007 (see Figure 2 (a)). We might be able to identify a lease on life for platform 3 if more recent data were available.
The lease on life effect for platform 1 ( 1  = 0.0027) appears three times stronger than that for platform 2 ( 2  = 0.0009). However, please note that i  measures lease on life per unit of traffic (i.e., packet) effect. While we do not have precise data about the size of each service/application, according to the industry experts, the average size of service/application of service 2 is two to three times larger than that of service 1 (Korea Database Agency 2005). Therefore, it is conceivable that the lease on life effects per service/application for platform 1 and 2 are not significantly different from each other.
While 2  is significant, 1  and 3  are not significant; that is, while discounted prices of platform 2 handsets induce some consumers to choose platform 2 over its successive platforms, discounted prices 20 of platform 1 and 3 handsets are not attractive enough to a consumer. This result was somewhat expected because of the following two reasons. First, as of November 2011, about 15% of available handsets have platform 2, whereas only 4% and 3% of them have platform 1 and 3 respectively (see Table 5 ). It shows that in the presence of all four platforms, while the demand for platform 2 was still relatively strong, the demand for platform 1 and 3 was weak. Second, platform 3 was released only 4 months after platform 2 was introduced and the marginal difference between platform 2 and 3, in terms of its supports for services, was not significant (see Table 1 ). It has been discussed that if the difference between two product-lines is not sufficiently large cannibalization is more severe (Kim and Chhajed 2000) .
The Economics of Backward Compatibility
In this section, we focus on and discuss the economic impact of backward compatibility on the platform market. Our results suggest that on average every 1 million packets of service 1 consumptions by newer platforms (platform 2 -4) users via backward compatibility create 2.7 new or retained subscribers (lease on life) of platform 1. Similarly, every 1 million packets of service 2 consumptions by platform 3 and 4 users create 0.9 new or retained subscribers of platform 2. There are users who might not have adopted a mobile Internet platform if the platforms were not backward compatible. Clearly backward compatibility creates a new lease on life, and thereby, additional revenue for the wireless carrier. However, whether this is an intended and ideal consequence of backward compatibility for the carrier could be arguable because the lease on life (i.e., the extended life span of an old platform) induces additional costs. To serve new users of the old platform, the carrier needs to continue to maintain the infrastructure such as the mobile network and distribution channels for its supporting services, and hence, net profit from lease on life can be either positive or negative. In fact, in January 2008, the wireless carrier that we study merged the distribution channels for services for generations 1 and 4 into one, and in early 2012, it terminated 2G mobile network that supported old platforms. Similarly, in a related industry example, only the first three models of Sony PlayStation 3 are fully backward compatible with PlayStation 2 games, and Sony is gradually shutting down channels for PlayStation 2 online games. Microsoft also recently announced that it would stop supports for its old Windows versions. We model the lifecycle of multi-generation platforms from a diffusion point of view and investigate the impact of backward compatibility on the adoption of older generations using the data we collected from a major wireless carrier in an Asian country. Our approach complements the previous literature that mostly focuses on the positive effect of backward compatibility on the subsequent generations.
Our main finding is that the backward compatibility has a perhaps unintended consequence: the continued use of old generation services on new generation platforms provides a fresh lease on life for old generation platforms. This finding has important managerial implications for ecosystems built around platforms. Depending on the industry, the lease on life for an old generation platform could cause significant amount of maintenance expenses to the firm, and to avoid these extra expenses, the firm may need to force migration to newer versions by deliberately shutting down the old platform or phase out backward compatibility for an older platform at some point in time. .
Our study presents many research directions in which it can be extended. For example, with a richer dataset, the impact of the complementary services on adoption could be explored in more depth, controlling for the service variety growth over time for all platforms and service intensity of usage (number of apps used on average by a user of a specific platform). Also, one could classify digital services by content and purpose and measure the impact of each of these classes on the lease on life phenomenon. It would be very interesting to see if lease on life is affected more by utilitarian consumption (e.g. mobile banking , messaging, weather reports, news) vs more hedonic consumption (ringtones, online music, etc.). With individual-level adoption and consumption data one could potentially measure also by how much the gap between hardware purchases (platform upgrades) is increased for different demographic groups in response to backward compatibility.
Appendix.
The following is the parameter estimates and model fits for each variable that we interpolated:
1. 
